

6. A broader institutional perspective – process vs structure perspective

Based on the general focus on technology, information and administration in the two previous chapters, an expanded institutional perspective consisting of a process and structure approach will be developed in this chapter. In section 6.1, the process approach will first be developed. The focus here will be on communication as an element in institutionalization processes in administration.

In this section, the main concepts of discourse, institutionalization and definitional power will be discussed.

be central. The operationalization will incorporate elements from the social constructivist

theoretical framework that was reviewed in chapter four. In section 6.2, I will develop a structural approach that

is able to capture information responsibility, technical design, economic organization and departmental responsibility as structural properties of the administration, which are produced and reproduced in communication. A

concept of power will be presented that focuses on how the four mentioned structural properties are used as resources of influence in negotiations. In the structural approach, resource distribution, interpretative frameworks and legitimation will

be overall structural elements that are included in the theoretical understanding. These will

subsequently be operationalized and used in the analysis of the CVR case.

1.1 MANAGEMENT FROM A PROCESS PERSPECTIVE

The general aim of this section is to develop a theoretical framework that is capable of conceptualising communication as a central element in institutionalisation processes in administration.

Power and discourse are first explained as central concepts in the understanding of communication as collective opinion formation. Institutionalisation is then examined in relation to the three

institutional theories in chapter five. With this as a background, institutionalisation processes

are formulated as sanctioned, negotiated elements in the discourse, either as obligations on the

normative aspects of the discourse or as legal obligations established by legislation. With this

theoretical perspective, the aim is to understand the institutionalisation of CVR as a result of negotiation

arising from competing interpretations of definitions, problems and solutions, etc. As a conclusion to

the section, it is operationalised, among other things, by using the so-called SCOT model ("Social Construction Of Technology").

Discourse and power

The purpose of this section is first to introduce the concept of discourse based on March and Olsen's concept of institutions. Subsequently, the concept of power will be discussed.

If institutions are considered in sociological neo-institutionalism, these were anchored in norms, habits, rules of action, etc. In relation to communication understood as collective opinion formation in a political

context, this concept of institution is too broad. In other words, a clarification of the concept of institution

is required. In relation to this, Peter Bogason highlights that there is a lack of precision in the concept of

institution in March and Olsen. The concept becomes too imprecise when it denotes such different

conditions as states, organizations, systems. Against this background, Bogason defines a political

institution as "a political institution is a:

authoritative interaction network related to a policy problem (...) an institution aims to create order related to the policy problem and provide participants with a shared understanding of meaning".¹⁹⁸

In relation to the analysis of CVR, this definition is generally plausible, as it focuses on interaction in a political context understood as opinion formation.

¹⁹⁸ Bogason, 1989, p. 223.

Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen operates with a similar concept of institutions as sanctioned ideals and notions.¹⁹⁹ The difference to Bogason is that Åkerstrøm describes institutions as discursively founded. Their subject areas are integrated into something linguistic, that is, the subject area gains meaning and is understood through linguistic constellations and conceptual contexts in a broad sense.²⁰⁰ By discourse I mean here:

"... an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. Discourses frame certain problems; that is to say, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others. The ideas, concepts, and categories that constitute a discourse can vary in character: they can be normative or analytical convictions; they can be based on historical references"²⁰¹.

In the process analysis in the next chapter, I will analyze themes uncovered in notes, reports, faxes, etc. as discourse phenomena. By institutionalization, I will generally understand the process by which this formation of meaning takes place, or in other words, how ideals and notions are sanctioned within the discourse in administration.

This view of institutionalization and discourse is shared by Ove Kaj Pedersen. He asks the interesting question of how the economic discourse - balance of payments, foreign debt, and so on - enters the political debate²⁰², and basically answers very broadly that the state as the sovereign "owner" of an area is the prerequisite at all. In a study of the economic discourse, he has followed the ideas of a "new fiscal policy" in the 1930s through the development of circular models in the 1950s from a small circle of people around Statistics Denmark and the Ministry of Finance, a number of commission reports, and a historical compromise between liberal and social democratic positions.²⁰³ In this sense, a certain knowledge thus makes it possible to regulate and manage. But it requires that the possibilities inherent in it are accepted. Pedersen's fundamental problem seemed to be the following:

"Discovering a problem and having it accepted as a problem involves selection. The number of possible problems is large, perhaps infinite. Only a few are singled out and given the status of problems. Even fewer find broad political acceptance"²⁰⁴

He sees such processes as an interaction between parties and officials, government and organizations with the aim of formulating situation descriptions and transferring these to political interventions.

Discourse should not be reduced to simple rhetoric. Discourse is always rooted in a concrete social and political practice. In addition to discussing problems and problem solutions, this practice also includes aspects of a political and organizational nature. The quote below emphasizes this fact. If processes in administration are interpreted as discourse, it also includes frames of meaning and interpretation that are established in the process itself:

"Policy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective interpretation of common experience, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definition of ideas that guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate them to act. These struggles involve far more than manipulative rhetoric. The institutionally disciplined rhetoric of policy and planning influence problem selection as well as problem analysis, organizational identity as well as administrative strategy."²⁰⁵

The key point in the quote is that as an element of policy implementation, there is a struggle over classifications of problems. This leads to the issue of power.

¹⁹⁹ Andersen, 1994, p. 4.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 12.

²⁰¹ Shanks, 1993, p. 45.

²⁰² Pedersen, 1995, p. 95.

²⁰³ Pedersen, 1995, p. 98. ²⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 96.

²⁰⁵ Fisher & Forester, p. 2.

As a starting point, Foucault's concept of power is used in discourse analysis:

"By power one must first of all understand the diversity of power relations which are immanent in the area in which they are exercised and whose organization they constitute."²⁰⁶

In a more specific definition, power is defined discourse analytically at the boundary between what can be thematized as a problem and what cannot. Power is defined overall as the constitution of a "field". The concept of field is defined here as a network of positions or an interaction network from which actors can act. An example could be a policy field that delimits a political problem area and constitutes a network of interest organizations, state institutions, etc. In relation to CVR, a field has been established on the basis of the decision to establish CVR. A number of actors are placed in this field. The analysis of the communication shows how this field is formed by, among other things, defining roles for the actors involved in the discourse.

In forming this field, a boundary is further drawn between which problems can be brought to the fore and which cannot. The boundary drawing can be seen as an extension of Bachrach and Baratz's concept of power, which focused on which decisions were not allowed into the decision-making process. In relation to this definition, I will consider power as a constitutive or productive power. There is therefore no focus on exclusion, but instead on what is included in a field and what is included in its environment.

A similar concept of power is defined as definitional power in the Swedish study of power. According to this analysis of power, we find ourselves in a situation where, "more and more stakeholders are fighting to get the shape of our worldview".²⁰⁷ On this background, the concept of defining power is defined in two dimensions. The first relates to determining the problem, problem solving, etc. in linguistic categories: "to determine what is the problem (...) the ability to describe threats, development perspectives, solutions and action possibilities".²⁰⁸ The second dimension in the definition concerns the control of access to formulating problems and problem solutions: "the ability to determine which actors who must gain access to the public conversation. Only certain individuals and collectives enjoy authority. Some actors appear as good people and others are seen as opponents, enemies and scapegoats".²⁰⁹

The problem with this concept of power is that power is seen as a resource that is unequally distributed and that simply needs to be distributed in a new way to secure the ideals of management. This issue has been addressed by Philippe Daudi, among others. He criticizes the usual perception of power within organizational theory. He believes that power is understood here in a primitive way, as if it were a thing, an attribute or a concrete reality: "Power is conceptualized by the primitive discourse as if it were a concrete means by which to govern and dominate; a means to be owned..."²¹⁰ Daudi believes that this perception can be seen as a discourse that has its roots in the Western world's way of thinking²¹¹, and that members of an organization think in terms of this concept of power. The result is that there is a tendency for both superiors and subordinates to conform to it.²¹²

The key point in relation to the analysis in the present context is that the traditional concept of power is instrumental in the sense that it separates power from the actual shaping of actors, interests, and

²⁰⁶ Foucault, 1978, p. 104.

²⁰⁷ SOU, 1990, Democracy and power in Sweden, p. 44.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Daudi, 1986, p. 1.

²¹¹ Ibid. p. 2

²¹² According to Daudi, this means that superiors behave as if there was no interdependence between superiors and superiors, and that subordinates forget that they can use "contra-coercive" strategies.

etc. in the discourse. In this interpretation of the CVR decision-making process, the formulation of problems, solutions, etc. associated with the distribution of roles in the discourse becomes a power in itself. Actors are not considered "external" in relation to the discourse. Elements in the discourse are formulated as to who should be responsible for information, departmental responsibility, etc. In other words, I will consider the allocation of roles in the discourse as central. It is thus not the case that actors, as in a traditional power analysis, are each equipped with interests and given "amounts of power", "power potentials" or "power bases".

I do not believe that power understood as the constitution of a policy field can replace the traditional conception of power formulated by Weber and Robert Dahl, but I see it as a necessary supplement.

In the analysis of CVR, I see the discourse-based concept of power as fruitful, justified by the fact that the classical hierarchical relations have been partially rendered ineffective. Furthermore, the choice of this concept of power is justified by the fact that I have chosen to focus on communication, and thus to a lesser extent on the power of individuals. A traditional analysis would not make sense in relation to CVR. It is a non-existent system that is created in the process. It would be absurd to talk about "more or less" power over a system that does not exist.

Based on these considerations, I choose to use the concept of definitional power placed in a discourse analytical framework. With the shift to a discourse-based concept of power, focus is placed on which problems are formulated, which roles and responsibilities are assigned, and which technological and economic choices are made in solving these problems.

Considering the two dimensions of definitional power mentioned above, a concept is required that is able to capture the problem of regulating actors' access to formulate problems and solutions. Based on this problem, Marten Hajer has introduced the concept of discourse coalition, defined as "a group of actors, who share a social construct".²¹³

If the technical solution of CVR is considered a socially constructed artifact, this concept will be able to capture the fact that certain groups in coalition come together to define artifacts. Artefacts have a meaning that is negotiable and thus in principle changeable. I will return to a more precise definition of this issue in the operationalization of the process approach. Before that, I will elaborate on the issue of institutionalization.

Institutionalization versus institution

The main question in this section will be: if communication in administration is considered as discourse, how is this institutionalized in the form of rules of action as described in sociological neo-institutionalism and as institutional positions described in historical institutionalism? In relation to these theoretical positions, I will focus on how institutions are formed. The starting point will be a theoretical clarification of the concept of institution used by March and Olsen. This will be done by anchoring institutionalization in a sociological paradigm of knowledge:

"All human activity is subject to habit formation. Any action that is repeated frequently will become fitted into a pattern which can then be reproduced with little effort. and ipso facto is perceived by the actor as that pattern.

²¹⁴ Institutionalization occurs whenever different actors mutually typify habitual actions. Put another way, any typification of this kind is an institution²¹⁵..... By their very existence, institutions also control human behavior by establishing predefined patterns of behavior that channel behavior in one direction, even though many others are theoretically possible."

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²¹³ Shanks, 1993, p. 45.

²¹⁴ Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 71.

²¹⁵ Ibid. p. 72

²¹⁶ Ibid. p. 73.

The key point here is institutionalization, understood as the process by which habits or norms become rules with relative stability, so that they can function as a background for action. The latter is highlighted in the quote by the fact that institutions control human behavior. Habits and social phenomena are experienced as objective reality: "as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact".²¹⁷

The question now is, in what way are habits experienced as objective reality or as externally imposed facts? Jepperson²¹⁸ has introduced a distinction between "culture", "regime" and "formal organization" as carriers of institutionalized norms. Institutionalization with culture as the carrier involves the development of rules that do not rely on a central authority or authority to function. Sanctions are not explicit here. This form of institutionalization can be viewed in relation to March and Olsen's definition of institutions as rules of action. Institutionalization as regimes as the carrier involves the formulation of explicit rules in a central authority system. Examples here are the legal system, international conventions, etc. Institutionalization with formal organization as the carrier involves the development of rules that coordinate action through formal descriptions of roles and work areas in an organization. This form of institutionalization can be viewed in relation to the historical institutionalism described in the previous chapter. The key point here is that formal organization in its original form as described by Weber can be considered as the institutionalization of purposive rational action. Culture, regime and formal organization are three basic types of institutionalization. In practice, institutionalized behavior will be based on combinations of the three basic forms.

The institutionalization process is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The figure is primarily intended to provide an overview of the three positions in the last chapter and then the expanded institutional framework of analysis.




Figure 6-Error! Unknown argument for parameter. Heuristic placement of institutionalization processes in relation to the three institutional paradigms in chapter five.

²¹⁷ Haldén and Kjær, p. 12

²¹⁸ Jepperson, 1991, pp. 150f.

The four positions are placed in the diagram, stretched in the horizontal dimension by the concept of action and in the vertical dimension by harmony and conflict. This is justified by the four positions' emphasis on the concept of **power**. In **sociological** neo-institutionalism, the concept of action was based on a logic of action such as the "logic of appropriateness". This was illustrated by the trash can model and the "muddling-through" model. This view of action also applies in the extended institutional framework.

With the concept of discourse as the object of analysis, the focus was directed towards the formulation of problems and problem solutions by different actors, and how certain solutions were institutionalised in negotiations. At the opposite end, the "logic of instrumentality" appears as the logic of action. In both economic neo-institutionalism and historical institutionalism, assumptions about strategic instrumental action are operated on. Just with two very different justifications - in economic neo-institutionalism, action is a priori determined as strategic. In historical institutionalism, strategic action is a historically specific phenomenon.

In the vertical dimension, the extended institutional position operates with a discourse-based concept of power, where the focus is on how the agenda is set through the definition of problems, solutions, etc. This can be seen in contrast to sociological neo-institutionalism, where the concept of power is not given much space. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the placement of economic neo-institutionalism as a position that emphasizes harmony may initially seem surprising. The reason for this placement is due to a lack of conceptualization of the phenomenon of power. As described earlier, this lack was attributed to the use of a pluralistic paradigm of power. The criticism of this concept of power was, among others, developed above by Philippe Daudi. In historical institutionalism, the emphasis is on conflict as a fundamental feature of society and administration.

In relation to what follows, it is central that the institutionalization process is carried partly by culture and partly by formal organization. These two forms of institutionalization will be related to the model in Figure 6.2 below. With the model, I will seek to concretize the expanded institutional analysis framework. The concepts of ideal, discourse and institution are introduced and related to the CVR case.

In an extended institutional analysis of the CVR Act as an institutional construction, the analysis will consist of a history of its creation. In other words, it is an analysis of how ideals are translated into discourse and institutionalized, see Figure 6.2.




Figure 6-Error! Unknown argument for parameter. Graphical illustration of the elements of the process analysis. It should be emphasized here that there is no temporal sequence from ideal to discourse and to institution. In other words, the model does not assume a "causal relationship" from the formulation of a political ideal to its implementation in the administration. This is marked in Figure 6.2 by the arrows. These emphasize that problems and problem solutions are formulated and only some of these are institutionalized.

The first link that is focused on is the emergence of ideal concepts. In relation to the CVR case, these ideal concepts will be concepts of the fully integrated system. In discourse analysis, the ideal should not be traditionally understood as the establishment of political goals followed by implementation in the administration. The ideal only gains meaning as discourse:²¹⁹ "Discourses are rooted in ideals. The transition from ideal to discourse involves an independence of the ideal (...) A discourse constantly creates new themes rooted in the ideal."²²⁰

Above, institutionalization was considered to be carried by culture and formal organization, respectively. Instead of these concepts, I will use Højbjerg and Marcher's distinction between first-order and second-order institutionalization.²²¹ This changed language is introduced to emphasize that institutionalization is not analyzed via culture and formal organization anchored in norms, but instead by actors committing themselves to roles, expectations, etc. formulated discursively.

With ~~first-order institutionalization, the commitment~~ first-order institutionalization, the commitment to discursive distinctions occurs with reference to the normative aspects of discourse. The formulation of spaces for action that are not in accordance with the constitutive distinctions of the ideal can thus be sanctioned by exclusion of the actor or by a discursive limitation of the actor's role.²²² Discursive positions are formed that regulate who should be responsible for what and who should govern what.

The questions to be asked are: "Who is set as the subject who can process, regulate and investigate which object? What competencies are attached to the processing, regulating and investigating subject."²²³

With ~~second-order institutionalization, the obligation~~ second-order institutionalization, the obligation occurs with reference to legislation: "a particular transversal discourse - the legal one - whose special meaning is in principle based on regulating the relationship between discourses"²²⁴ .

Institutionalization is thus in the expanded institutional position not anchored in ~~norms~~ norms, habits, etc. understood in a sociological new institutional sense but instead in discourse. In relation to the CVR, institutionalization can be considered as the determination of roles in various documents. In addition to technical aspects in communication, who is to do what is also formulated. From an institutional perspective, these formulations are central as obligations imposed on actors. With the distinction, the roles formulated via reports, etc. that circulate internally in the administration can be considered as first-order institutionalization. If roles are formulated as part of the law, actors are legally obligated or a second-order institutionalization.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that political institutions, viewed as institutionalizations of discourse, have a history, and express selected political goals, ideals, and norms, possibly shaped through coalition formation. Through institutionalization processes, negotiated elements of discourse are sanctioned either as obligations on the discourse's normative aspects or as legal obligations established by legislation.

²¹⁹ "The ideal is in itself empty, and only gains meaning precisely when in its discursive formation it is referred to in connection with the articulation of problems, subjects, objects, and so on", Andersen, 1995, p. 19.

²²⁰ Andersen, 1995, p. 19.

²²¹ Højbjerg and Marcher, 1995, p. 28.

²²² Højbjerg and Marcher, 1995, p. 28.

²²³ Andersen, 1994, p. 17.

²²⁴ Højbjerg and Marcher, 1995, p. 28.

Operationalization

If the CVR Act is considered an institutional construct, it determines which actors must do what, what information must be registered, and who must deliver which data.

The starting point in the process analysis of CVR is formed by formulated ideal concepts of an integrated information system. Elements of such a system were presented in chapter three. On the basis of this ideal concept, an interpretation of the creation of CVR is made possible through the analysis of problems, problem solutions in communication and an examination of which actors participate. The construction of CVR as an integrated information system is included in communication in the administration and is thus given meaning.

In operationalizing the discourse approach, I will use the SCOT model ("Social Construction of Technology") developed by Bijker.²²⁵ This is a social constructivist analysis model. According to this model, the analysis consists of the following four steps:

First, relevant social groups are determined:

"The concept of a relevant social group (...) is used to denote institutions and organisations, (...) as well as organized and unorganized groups of individuals. The key requirement is that all members of a certain social group share the same set of meaning, attached to a specific artefact"²²⁶

In relation to CVR, the determination of relevant social groups or actors will consist of an investigation of which actors have which interpretations of CVR.

Secondly, different interpretations or technological frameworks are analyzed as defined in chapter four:

"The concept of "technological frame" is intended to apply to the interactions between various actors. Thus it is not an individual characteristic, nor the characteristics of systems or institutions; frames are located between actors, not *in* actors or *above* actors. (...) A technological frame is built up when interaction around an artifact starts and continues"²²⁷

In the analysis, I will use the concept of interpretation or interpretive framework instead of the concept of technological framework. This analysis was presented in chapter two, where the five models of CVR were presented. The third step in the SCOT analysis consists of an analysis of interpretive flexibility as mentioned in chapter four. In the analysis of CVR, this will be done by analyzing which problems and solutions emerge in communication. The fourth step consists of an analysis of how a particular interpretation is stabilized, and finally how interpretive possibilities cease. The latter will be understood as institutionalization of the first and second order, respectively.

In relation to these points, the analysis of the CVR decision-making process will consist of three parts:

In the first part, the five models presented in chapter two are analyzed. This corresponds to step two of the SCOT model. They will be analyzed here as different interpretative frameworks.

In the second part, the interpretations are analyzed over time. This can be seen as a combination of step 1 and step 2 of the SCOT analysis. The emphasis here is on an analysis of different interpretations over time.

In the third part, interpretations are also analyzed over time. This part corresponds to points three and four in the SCOT model above. This analysis will be carried out with a focus on how information responsibility, departmental responsibility, technical solution and economic organization are included in

²²⁵ Bijker, 1990, pp. 90ff.

²²⁶ Pinch & Bijker, 1987, p. 30.

²²⁷ Bijker, 1990, p. 123.

communication, and how these are institutionalized. This will involve coalition formation defined by actors coming together on the same interpretation of CVR.

With regard to the issue of power, I will incorporate the concept of definitional power as described above. In the analysis, this will be done by examining how threats, development perspectives, solutions and options for action are discursively formulated.

1.2 MANAGEMENT FROM A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE.

The question posed in this section is how information responsibility, departmental responsibility, technical design and financing as structural properties are included as elements in communication. This problem will be examined from two perspectives. Firstly, how to understand how these properties are produced and reproduced as structural properties in communication. Secondly, how these elements are used as means to influence the decision-making process. In answering these questions, a more nuanced understanding of action and rationality is first explained. Anthony Giddens' structuration theory is then introduced. Subsequently, the theory is concretized in a model. Before the operational rationalization, the issue of power is addressed. In contrast to the discourse-based concept of power, power in the structural approach is understood as an actor's use of resources in communication as means to change the course of a decision-making process.

The concept of action, intentionality and rationality.

If we consider the concept of action in the three institutional paradigms in the last chapter, there was disagreement about the weighting of the individual's intentions. The strongest was the new institutional economy, which linked intentions to an a priori given size, utility maximization. In sociological new institutionalism and in historical institutionalism, the individual's intentions were downplayed. The focus here was on rules of action and historical circumstances:

"The observation of what actors do and say *in situ* is considered a prerequisite for relevant knowledge of political life as well as the building block for macro-political conceptualization"²²⁸

By practical consciousness I mean "all the things which actors know tacitly about how to 'go on' in the context of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression".²²⁹

The central thing about practical consciousness is routine: "the repetitiveness of activities which are undertaken in like manner day after day".²³⁰ Practical consciousness is not always verbalised, but constitutes an important element in understanding why we act as we do. By discursive consciousness I mean the process by which actions are expressed verbally.

Discursive consciousness thus encompasses the situations in which we formulate discursively why we act as we do. Furthermore, by discursive consciousness I will understand rationalization of action. This will be understood as an action being supported or legitimized with arguments. The boundary between practical and discursive consciousness is fluid, and is constantly changing through learning processes and socialization.

Another significant difference in the theoretical perspectives on administration is the perception of rationality. If we first consider the traditional perception of administration, the assumption is that actors act in a "transparent world" with clear goals. This applies both from a governance perspective, where political choices are implemented neutrally in administration, but also at the individual level, when decisions are made in administration. In economic neo-institutionalism, this assumption was softened. With the introduction of "bounded rationality", the idea of

²²⁸ Bang, 1987, p. 4.

²²⁹ Giddens, 1984, p. xxiii.

²³⁰ Ibid.

Limited information about means and ends was introduced. Only a limited number of alternatives were taken into account to ensure optimal goal fulfillment. Furthermore, rationality was linked to the intentions of utility-maximizing actors.

Considering the decision-making process problem, a radical alternative was formulated in sociological neo-institutionalism. Thus, the starting point of the "muddling through" and garbage can models was that the goals are unclearly formulated and changing over time. The goal-means relationship is unclear, either because it is poorly formulated or because knowledge about this relationship is developed in the decision-making process. Seen in relation to the aforementioned positions, norms, everyday knowledge, etc. are introduced as central components in the sociological perspective on administration. The problem, however, is that there is a lack of a concept of acting actors.

The starting point for a reconciliation of these apparently incompatible positions is based on the assumption that consciousness is always intentional: "consciousness is always intentional; it always intends or is directed toward objects".²³¹ If we next consider the concept of rationality, this is formulated above as either the administration as a whole or individuals set goals and then direct action towards the realization of these goals.

In a broader understanding of rationality, it has been argued that action should not be understood exclusively in the above end-means perspective: "the bulk of human activity does not consist of trying to achieve hitherto unrealized objectives, but of maintaining dependable relationships with the environment and keeping things going".²³² The key point here is that rational action is not reduced to simple end-means considerations but also involves knowledge of norms or rules of action as formulated in sociological neo-institutionalism:

"Instead of being rational with respect to objectives, it is rational on the one hand, with respect to opportunities and through them to their defining context, and, on the other hand, with respect to behavior of the other actors - to the decisions they make, and to the game which is thus established among them"²³³.

Thus, conscious action does not have to be rational in the narrow sense but can also be irrational when actions are placed in a concrete context where knowledge of the "rules of the game" is central.

The assumption in the structural analysis is that actors in the administration act intentionally and purposefully. By purposeful intentional action I mean "the application of 'knowledge to secure certain outcomes or qualities'".²³⁴ The concept of practical consciousness, which was presented above, further assumes that the agent operates on the basis of knowledge that cannot necessarily be formulated: "The agent does not have to be capable of formulating the knowledge he applies as an abstract proposition, nor does it have to the case that such knowledge is valid".²³⁵

With this definition of purposeful action, I will first present an overarching conceptual framework. Next, the issue of power will be elucidated based on the above understanding of action. Under the issue of power, I will specifically elucidate how resources are used to change the direction of a given decision-making process.

²³¹ Berger and Luckmann, 1972, p. 34 cf. Lundqvist, 1987, p. 34.

²³² Lundqvist, 1987, p. 34.

²³³ Lundqvist, 1987, p. 34.

²³⁴ Giddens, 1976, p. xxiii.

²³⁵ Giddens, 1976, p. 76.

Structuration theory

I derive the overall approach to the structural approach from Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. The overall starting point is that the social sciences cannot limit themselves to looking at the actions of actors. These actions are always both limited by structural conditions but at the same time also made possible by these structural conditions. In structuration theory, Giddens operates with five main elements: structure, social system, the duality of structure and structuration.

Structure is defined as a recursive set of rules and resources organized as properties of social systems.²³⁶ Rules as properties include how meaning is constituted and how different forms of behavior are regulated via sanctions. These rules largely correspond to rules of action defined in sociological neo-institutionalism. Resources are defined as authoritative and allocative. Authoritative resources are resources used in the generation of authority over persons. Allocative resources are resources used in the generation of power over material resources. The concepts of rules and resources will be discussed later.

Social systems are defined as produced and reproduced relations between individual and collective, organized as social practices.²³⁷ Giddens defines structuration as conditions under which rules and resources are drawn upon: "Structuration: Conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of social systems".²³⁸ In social practice, rules and resources are produced and reproduced as context-specific properties. The concept of the duality of structure is defined by the fact that rules and resources are considered both as a medium for and the result of social practice. The key point here is that rules and resources as structural properties are not "external" in relation to interaction. Rules and resources appear exclusively through production and reproduction in interaction.

The concept of structure has been used in French structuralism. Here, the concept has been used by Levi-Strauss, among others, in the understanding of myths. In another direction, functionalism, the concept has been used primarily descriptively. The focus was less on structure and primarily on function. The concept was used descriptively here to describe economic, political and social relations. In contrast, Giddens places the concept in relation to social interaction:

"A structure is not of 'group' 'collectivity' or 'organization'. These have structures. Groups, collectivities should be studied as systems of interaction"²³⁹

The quote emphasizes that the concept of structure is not considered a concept for describing relationships between actors. Lundqvist also gives a definition that emphasizes provisions of the concept of structure such as rules and resources in the above sense:

"Societal structures comprise patterns of activities and ideas in the form of institutions, relationships, procedures, role patterns, rules, myths together with their relevant resources."

Like Giddens, Niklas Luhmann emphasizes communication. Luhmann defines structure in relation to the concepts of time and space:

"The peculiar temporality of structure and process requires a closer determination. It would be false simply to conceive of structures as timeless and processes as temporal. Structures hold time reversibly because they keep a limited repertoire of options open. One can abolish or change them or, with their help, gain certainty for changes in other respects.

²³⁶ "Structurs(s): Rules and resources, organized as properties of social systems" Giddens, 1984. p. 25.

²³⁷ "System(s): Reproduced relations between actors or collectives, organized as regular social practices Ibid. p. 25.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

²³⁹ Giddens, 1976, p. 121.

Processes, on the other hand, mark the irreversibility of time. They consist of irreversible events. They cannot run backwards.²⁴⁰

This definition of the concept of structure emphasizes that these have a more permanent character in relation to processes. Processes considered in relation to time cannot be repeated. Structures hold time and thus choices. This understanding of structure moves away from the old social science problem of hypostatizing the concept of structure. This problem occurs when in social science one attributes substance to the concept of structure, without linking this directly to experience.

The central point is acting actors who constitute structure: "to inquire into the process of reproduction is to specify the connections between "structuration" and "structure".

By structuration in this context I understand rules and resources used in communication and legitimization to change a decision-making process. With this definition, resources will generally be understood as influence resources at the interaction level. At the structural level, I will analyze resources as the result of the structuration process. In relation to CVR, this understanding makes it possible to understand how resource distribution is produced and reproduced as an element of communication in the decision-making process.

Concretization of production and reproduction of structural properties.

In continuation of the analysis of action and rationality and Giddens' overall conceptual framework, I will here concretize this overall theoretical framework.

Scott has introduced a distinction that will serve as a prelude to the establishment of an actual analytical framework. He has conducted a number of analyses of "professional organizations" that have the use of knowledge as a central element as a common denominator. Employees employed in this type of organization differ from other organizations "not only in the relative amount of power they exercise, but in what aspects of work they attempt to control".²⁴¹ Thus, the analyses have shown that employees' influence is central not only in relation to what knowledge is used, but also on power structures and norms:

"Professionals attempt to employ their power to shape the institutional frameworks, supporting their activities in the broadest possible terms: They seek cognitive control - insisting that they are uniquely qualified to determine what types of problems fall under their jurisdiction and how the problems are to be categorized and processed; they seek normative control, determining who has the right to exercise authority over what decisions and actors in what situations; and they seek regulative control, determining what actions are to be prohibited and permitted and what sanctions are to be used"²⁴²

What is central in this quote is, firstly, that employees have influence or control over how work is carried out and organised. Secondly, I find the distinction between cognitive, normative and regulative control central. This distinction avoids reducing action to utility maximisation as was the case in economic neo-institutionalism. In relation to sociological neo-institutionalism, what is central is that rules of action do not only include norms of behaviour, but also include cognitive and regulative aspects of management. In relation to historical institutionalism, what is central is that cognitive aspects and norms are also given importance in addition to positions of power.

A similar distinction is made by Giddens. The ontological premise of Giddens is that all social interaction phenomena must be understood as linkages between power, meaning and

²⁴⁰ Luhmann, 1984, p. I. 25.

²⁴¹ Scott, 1995, sx

²⁴² Scott, 1995. sx

norms: "The components of social interaction are exhausted neither by its "meaningful" nor its "normative" content. Power is as integral an element of all social life as are meaning and norms."²⁴³ Giddens thus distinguishes between power as a property of communication and power as the use of resources in negotiations. This dual perspective is expressed in Figure 6.3.

<u>Interaction</u>	Communication/ discourse / collective opinion formation	Power	Sanction
<u>Rules & resources</u>	Interpretation	Resources	Norms for rational and efficient behavior in administration
<u>Produced and reproduced structural properties</u>	Interpretative framework e	Resource allocation Legitimization	

Figure 6-Error! Unknown argument for parameter. Overview of terms used from Giddens.

In Giddens, there is a methodological and not a substantive distinction between actor and structural analysis. Giddens thereby attempts to go beyond the traditional division between actor and structure. In an actor-structure analysis with a focus on structure, the following is bracketed:

"What from a structural point of view - where strategic action is bracketed - appears as a normatively co-ordinated legitimate order (...) from the point of view of strategic conduct represents claims, whose realization is contingent upon (...) responses of other actors. Their interconnectenes express the negotiated character of sanctions, relating to the production of meaning to the production of normative order"²⁴⁴

The focus of this section is on how rules and resources are produced and reproduced in communication. In continuation of Scott's distinction between cognitive, regulative and normative control, these concepts will be differentiated so that they are included partly at the interaction level and partly at the structural level. At the interaction level, the concepts of communication, power and sanction appear. These concepts are an extension of the analysis above, where sanction was understood either as sanctioning the normative aspects of discourse or sanctioning through legislation, communication as discourse and power as definitional power.

Production and reproduction, in my opinion, are a better concept than the "path-dependence" of sociological neo-institutionalism, where alternatives to the rational model were characterized as garbage cans or incremental solutions. The concept of "path-dependence" was more correct in this respect, but this concept was unable to accurately capture the way in which new solutions are conditioned by previous solutions.

In relation to historical institutionalism, a structural concept was formulated that is able to see these not as "external" explanatory variables, but instead as elements that are produced and reproduced in interaction.

In relation to economic neo-institutionalism, the concept of rationality was expanded by the application of practical consciousness.

In relation to the framework set out below, the focus will first be on assumptions about acting actors. Next, a general structuring model will be set up that illustrates how

²⁴³ Giddens, 1981, p. 26.

²⁴⁴ Bang, 1987, p. 15.

structural properties are produced and reproduced in communication. The focus is then on how resources relate to interpretive frameworks and legitimation.

Power as the use of resources in negotiations.

Traditionally, a one-to-one relationship is established between resources and power. The key point here is that some actors may be well-equipped in terms of resources, but not be able to exert influence in a given negotiation process, while others who are not well-equipped can exert influence on a given process. Power will be understood in the structural analysis as the ability of actors to mobilize resources. According to Giddens, social action is:

“ ... intrinsically involves the application of means to achieve outcome, brought about through direct intervention of an actor in a course of events (...) Power consequently represents the capabilities of the agent to mobilize resources to constitute those means. In this most general sense, as the capacity of an actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course, power refers to the transformative capacity of action. Transformative capacity cannot be equated with a capacity to make decisions or choices”²⁴⁵

The key point here is that an actor's intervention in a sequence of events involves the use of means. If we consider the concept of power in historical institutionalism, this was determined by the concept of institutional capacity: “These capacities are determined generally by the formal institutional positions in which actors find themselves and the material resources at their disposal”.²⁴⁶ A similar concept of power is thus used in structural analysis. The difference lies in the focus on how resources are used in communication.

The concept of power presented above and the discourse-based concept of power presented in the process approach are united in the structural approach through the use of the concept of resources understood as both structural properties, but also as a medium through which power is exercised:

“Both as an individual capacity and as a feature of the totality (...) power depends upon the utilization of resources. Resources are the media whereby transformative capacity is employed as power in the routine course of social interaction; but they are at the same time structural elements of social systems as systems, reconstituted through their utilization in social action”²⁴⁷

How is this perception of power linked to interpretive frameworks and legitimation in the diagram above? The key point here is that resources are used as means in the production of meaning or, in other words, in the production of interpretive frameworks but also in the legitimation of certain interpretive frameworks.

“Both communication and sanction have to be linked to power transactions. Resources are not just additional elements to the communication of meaning and to normative sanctions, as individuals and collectivists tend to believe, but include the means whereby meaningful and normative content of interaction is actualized.”²⁴⁸

Resources should not be considered exogenously as the amount of power or the amount of physical material. Allocative resources such as the amount of technology available, which was considered a material physical resource in the institutional economy, therefore take on a different meaning here. In the structural approach, technology should instead be perceived as political artifacts that are shaped and used as resources of influence in communication. Technology is thus understood in communication contexts as means that can be referred to, whereby these are put in relation to meaning and norms in interaction.

²⁴⁵ Giddens, 1976, cf. Bang, 1987, p. 17.

²⁴⁶ Campbell, 1995, p. 11.

²⁴⁷ Giddens, 1979, p. 92.

²⁴⁸ Bang, 1987, p. 15.

Technology and access to information are perceived in the context of communication as means that can be referred to, whereby these enter as a meaningful and normative content in the interaction. In this understanding of the CVR process, the use of an existing information responsibility will be used in the production of interpretive frameworks, and it will also be used in legitimization by referring to legislation on how information responsibility has historically been assigned.

The key point in this understanding is that when reference is made to technical organization or economic organization in communication, it is a question of the production of interpretative frameworks, where reference to physical databases and network connections or specific items in the Finance Act is used as a means to change a decision. These are thus constructions that are used in communication, and thus influence the constitution of the CVR up to the adoption of the act.

In continuation of the above, it is important to emphasize that power cannot be directly derived from communication. In contrast to the traditional concept of power, a discourse-based concept of power is used:

"Power cannot be derived from the actual use of communication and sanctions, precisely because it expresses the capability to apply communication and sanctions. It manifests the capabilities of actors to make certain 'accounts count' and to enact or resist sanctioning processes"²⁴⁹

In relation to legitimation, Bourdieu and Rossenau have introduced the concept of symbolic power. This concept aims, firstly, to conceptualize the central fact that the formulation of certain solutions and problems constitutes a power in itself. Secondly, Bourdieu and Rossenau argue that this power relation is concealed by imposing this power relation on others through legitimation:

"Every power to exert symbolic violence, ie every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations, which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations"²⁵⁰

The quote shows how power relations gain their symbolic strength by being imposed as legitimate. According to Bourdieu and Rossenau, this operation conceals the power relation itself.

In a further treatment of the concept of power, Bourdieu and Rossenau link this with the concepts of autonomy and dependence. Autonomy is defined as the active production of meaning in communication. Dependence is given by the power relationship being presented as legitimate and the power relationship being concealed:

"All theories implicitly or explicitly constructed on other axioms lead on either to make the creative freedom of individuals the source of symbolic action, considered as autonomous from the objective conditions in which it is performed, or to annihilate symbolic action as such, by refusing it any autonomy with respect to its material conditions of existence"²⁵¹

Based on the above, "power" should not be reduced to a quantity that certain people are endowed with or are endowed with. Nor can power be reduced to structurally given elements in an administration, as was the case in historical institutionalism. Instead of a methodological collectivism and methodological individualism, Bourdieu and Rossenau thus recommend a methodological situationalism in the study of political decision-making processes. The understanding of a complex political situation is conditioned by the actors' knowledge of power relations:

"Power (...) does neither reduce to meaningful and symbolic action, via the capacity of individuals to realize their will, nor to society's 'reason' for the existence or reproduced social items, via the

²⁴⁹ Bang, 1987, p. 15.

²⁵⁰ Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, p. 4.

²⁵¹ Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, p. 7.

capacity of collectives to realize their vested interests. Action involves invention in the world, thus producing definite outcomes"²⁵²

If this issue is considered in relation to the CVR case, it can be seen that it is not a question of "brute force", but instead it is the ability to define problems and solutions (technical, departmental, information responsibility and financial) and to define who should do what and who is responsible for what. This happens in a negotiation game, where several administrative units must negotiate a solution regarding CVR.

Operationalization

I will look at economic organization, technical organization, departmental and informational responsibility organization as structural properties that are produced and reproduced in communication. This process will be analyzed through a focus on interpretative frames and legitimation, which are also produced and reproduced in interaction.

Historically given structures are reproduced in the negotiations themselves, in that these are used, among other things, as resources of influence for the structure's new construction and reproduction.

The key point in relation to the above is that structures are not analyzed as if they were outside of communication. In the analysis of communication in the CVR process, we examine how structures are produced and reproduced through interaction.

Resources

With regard to resources, these are referred to above as allocative and authoritative resources. Lundqvist operates with a typology consisting of four types of resources:

"We have selected four types of resources, which seem to cover most possible cases: informative resources, and material resources, personnel resources, legitimizing resources, and material resources"²⁵³

Access to and control over information resources and material resources corresponds to the concept of allocative resources above. Access to and control over personnel corresponds to the concept of authoritative resources above. In this context, I will not consider legitimation as a resource. In comparison to the power issue above, legitimation is considered a concept that expresses how resources are included in communication. Or in other words, how arguments for access to and control over resources are presented. In the analysis of CVR, the following typology of resources will be used:

Technical organization means access to and control over the specific design of the information system (technical organization).

Information responsibility is defined here in a narrow sense as responsibility for the collection and maintenance of information in an integrated information system. The key point is that control over the specific design of the information system does not necessarily involve control over the information stored in the system. With regard to collection and maintenance, this responsibility can be assigned to a specific management unit (information responsibility organization).

Departmental responsibility will be understood as responsibility for the departmental organization of personnel (departmental organization).

Economic organization should be understood as access to and control over the sale of information. In addition, financing will be understood as solutions for how to establish solutions for the construction and operation of CVR (economic organization).

²⁵² Bang, 1987, p. 7.

²⁵³ Ibid. p. 96.

By the concept of power in structural analysis I will understand an intervention in a sequence of events, so that this changes direction. In structural analysis, the concepts of power and influence will be used with the same meaning.

The focus will be on how meaning is produced as interpretative frameworks, and how reproduction occurs via legitimation.

In continuation of the above theoretical considerations, I will analyze influence as interpretative frameworks and legitimation with a focus on how the resources technical organization, economic organization, information responsibility, departmental responsibility are used to influence the CVR decision-making process. Furthermore, I will focus on how resources are produced and reproduced as structural properties.

Interpretative frameworks

By interpretative framework I mean the production of meaning. A central element in the interpretative framework is knowledge. Considered as interaction phenomena, knowledge: "mutual knowledge refers generically to taken for granted "knowledge" which actors draw assume others possess (...) and which is drawn upon to sustain communication in interaction"²⁵⁴ - in the CVR case this is analysed thematically in the process analysis with a focus on technical, economic and departmental solutions. In the structural analysis, knowledge will be focused by analysing interpretative frameworks. As above, interpretations will be analysed as mobilisation of resources as a means of changing the CVR decision.

Identification

Sanctions will be analyzed in the process analysis. In the structural analysis, I will, following Berger and Luckmann, consider legitimation as "second-order meaning". The starting point is, as described in the section on process analysis, that prior to actual institutionalization, a common meaning and a common set of norms are developed in relation to a given phenomenon. By legitimation, I will understand that problems and alternative solutions are connected to broader cognitive frames, norms, etc. Legitimation "involves connecting it to wider cognitive frames, norms or rules. Legitimation 'explains' the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives".²⁵⁵ In the extended institutional perspective, actors (both individual and collective) are viewed as legitimation-maximizing

actors as opposed to efficiency-maximizing actors in the traditional view of administration. In continuation of Meyer and Rowan's theoretical perspective described earlier, it is central that organizations in administration appear efficient and rational: "Organizations that incorporate societally legitimized rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities".²⁵⁶

There is an ongoing mobilization of the interests of various administrations in relation to the design of the CVR. These are legitimized in parallel with reference to what is perceived as legitimate behavior in the administration.

6.3 SUMMARY

The process approach argued for a theoretical understanding of processes in administration by considering these as institutionalization processes, where discourse is institutionalized. With

²⁵⁴ Giddens, 1976, p. 107.

²⁵⁵ Scott, 1995, p. 46.

²⁵⁶ Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 53.

The concept of definitional power was focused on how a field is constituted partly through the definition of problems, solutions, development perspectives and options for action, and partly through coalition formation where some actors come together on a common definition of problem and solution. On this basis, it was concluded that political institutions, viewed as institutionalizations of discourse, have a history and express selected political goals, ideals and norms, possibly shaped through coalition formation. Via institutionalization processes, sanctions are negotiated elements of discourse, either as obligations on the discourse's normative aspects, or as legal obligations established by legislation.

The structural approach asked the question of how information responsibility, departmental responsibility, technical design and financing as structural properties are both produced and reproduced in the communication between the actors involved. This problem was examined from two perspectives: first, how to understand information responsibility, departmental responsibility, technical design and financing as structural properties that are produced and reproduced in communication. Second, how are these structural properties used as means to influence the decision-making process?

In answering these questions, a broader understanding of action and rationality was first argued. Then, the assumption was presented that action is intentional and purposeful and involves the use of knowledge understood in a broad sense. Thus, it is not necessarily possible to formulate this knowledge discursively. Furthermore, end-means rationality was extended to include knowledge of the "rules of the game".

Against this background, Anthony Giddens' structuration theory was introduced. With this conceptual framework, it became possible to understand structural properties as produced and reproduced in communication. Viewed from a structural perspective, a model was set up in which resource organization, interpretative frameworks and legitimation were considered as overall structural properties of administration as a social system. Structure was defined as rules and resources produced and reproduced in structuration processes. Resources are understood as 1+2+3+4. Rules are defined as the production of interpretative frameworks and as the legitimation of certain interpretative frameworks.

The structural analysis is carried out by bracketing purposeful action. At this level, CVR can be understood as the production and reproduction of interpretative frameworks, and the legitimization of these interpretative frameworks by ensuring that these are in accordance with rational and efficient task solving in the administration. In the

establishment of interpretative frameworks, 1+2+3+4 can be used as influence resources to influence the decision-making process, thereby creating a specific organization and distribution of resources. In contrast to the discourse-based concept of power, power in the structural perspective is understood as an actor's use of resources in changing the course of a decision-making process.